

Security Information

SECRET

21 August 1953

TO: Chief, SR/2
FROM: []
SUBJECT: Failure of [] Dispatch.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. The first few days after arrival in Germany on 12 August 1953 did not give any indication that the AECHAMP operation would not proceed as planned. The time during these days was utilized in making routine dispatch preparations with CSOS personnel, study by [] of operational material, and discussion of the operation itself with [] (as had been agreed upon in Headquarters prior to departure from Washington). These early discussions by [], [], and [] proceeded quite smoothly. [] seemed to be pleased with the clear-cut nature of the operation, with its primary purpose (exfiltration of []), and with its predetermined conclusion.

2. A meeting between [] was arranged for 14 August 1953. [], however, did not go into as great detail regarding the operation with [] as he had done with []. [] commented on the mission favorably - he said that he, speaking for [], thought the operation to be a worthwhile undertaking from the Lithuanian viewpoint, and one which would still be so even if only partially successful.

3. Up to this point -- Friday, 14 August 1953, -- there had been no indication that the mission would not go through as planned. All talk concerning the operation went on in a positive manner i.e., "when the dispatch took place," "when [] would be in Lithuania," etc.; not "if the dispatch took place," or "if [] would be in the country," etc. The first indication that something was not quite right with [] was on Saturday, 15 August 1953, when he was very morose and apparently deep in thought all the time. [] remarked to [] that he thought it unusual and detrimental for [] to be so enveloped in his mission at such a late date. [] mind, [] said, should be clear of undue concern by now and in a rested and alert condition in preparation for the dispatch itself.

4. Sunday [] mood was about the same as on Saturday, if not worse -- in spite of some recreational sightseeing, arranged in an effort to have him perk up a bit mentally.

5. The scene at which [] made known his lack of desire to undertake the operation actually started at approximately 2130 hours, Sunday, 16 August 1953. At this time [] and [] sat down

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together to test [] memory concerning the control signals and contact addresses. [] then suggested that a discussion be held once more (to include []) concerning [] situation and, more specifically, his failure to respond properly to certain control signals. This was agreed upon. However, before the agreed discussion could begin, [] began talking suddenly and very animatedly about the various problems in his operation, (these were the same problems gone into scores of times at Headquarters). His monologue continued in such a manner that it appeared to those listening as if [] had not as yet made up his mind as to whether he was going on the mission. This verbal tirade by [] took [] and [] by surprise. So much so as a matter of fact, that [] with a look of amazement, interrupted [] and said that he [] was getting a bit confused. [] said that it sounded to him as if [] was not sure as yet whether he was going on the mission, regarding which matter [] said he thought there was no question whatsoever. Then [] admitted that [] assumption was true. [] and [] expressed amazement at [] attitude and requested an explanation. [] said that he had never actually made up his mind regarding the mission, that he had always been only "50-50" about the matter, and that he had told this fact to all the KUBARK Headquarters officers who were in contact with him. [] knowing this to be untrue, very firmly told [] that he was sure that such an indication had never been made to any KUBARK Headquarters officers and that if it had been, [] would never had been in Germany. Thereupon, [] appeared to relent from his earlier allegation and turned to repeating his various doubts concerning the operation (all contained in Attachment B).

6. During the next few hours conversation, [] tried to draw [] into agreement with him that the operation should not be carried out. In this attempt, [] was unsuccessful, as a matter of fact, [] expressed very clearly and definitely at times that he thought the mission was good and that it should be carried out.

7. As the discussion continued, it became clear that it was not a case of "indecision" on [] part as to whether he should "go in", but, actually, a case of decision to not "go in". This clarity came into focus when the statements in favor of the mission made by [] and [] seemed to be shunted aside by [] without consideration, as if his mind refused to accept any thoughts that did not fit in with his own.

8. After a prolonged talk of about 4½ hours, during which [] gave scores of reasons why he said he was undecided as to whether he

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should "go in" or not but during which time there was no statement by him that he "would not go in," [] asked what he should do. He was told by [] that he should make up his mind -- quickly. AECHAMP I said he would have a firm decision by 0700 Monday, 17 August, at which time [] planned to go to CSOB. It was obvious, however, that [] decision had been made; that nothing [] had said in favor of the mission had influenced him to change his mind; and that the only "undecision" in [] mind was how and when to tell [] that he [] did not want to undertake the mission.

9. The following morning at 0600 [] awoke to find [] at work in the living room, writing something. Shortly, [] handed [] a note (Attachment A) which stated that [] refused to go on the mission. It appeared that [] did not have the courage to tell [] of his decision orally, but resorted to a written note. Two days later, [] wrote a detailed report outlining the reasons for his refusal to carry out the operation. The report is attached as Attachment B.

10. Regardless of the multifarious reasons cited in [] report, it is believed by [] with [] concurring that the true, primary reason for [] dropping out is the fact that he was afraid to "go in," having no confidence in himself and not believing that he could carry out the mission. This state of mind may have been engendered by the fact that Professor KAMINSKAS, his guiding light politically, advised him to reconsider his decision to undertake a mission into Lithuania, since he (KAMINSKAS) thought the situation was such that no good could come of an operation into Lithuania at the present time.

11. It is further believed by [] with [] again concurring, that [] had lacked a desire to go into Lithuania even prior to his departure from the United States. The reason for his coming to Germany without making this lack of determination known to KUBARK officers in Headquarters was apparently a lack of courage to do so, coupled with the hope that once he arrived in Germany [] and [] would look upon the mission as inadvisable and one that was too risky to carry out. On the contrary, however, [] and [] thought the mission worthwhile and one that should be carried out ([] was particularly vocal and positive in his statements to this effect). [] was then left with the unpleasant and shameful task of making known his refusal to undertake the mission without support from anyone and in contradistinction with the opinions of KUBARK, [] and [].

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